. . . while we have learned a great deal indeed about how we come eventually to construct and “explain” a world of nature in terms of causes, probabilities, space-time manifolds, and so on, we know altogether too little about how we go about constructing and representing the rich and messy domain of human interaction.
. . . we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative —stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing . . . a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and “narrative necessity” rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true or false.
. . . It was perhaps a decade ago that psychologists became alive to the possibility of narrative as a form not only of representing but of constituting reality . . .
Jerome Bruner, «The Narrative Construction of Reality», in Critical Inquiry, vol.18, n.1, p.1~21 ; Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, Autumn 1991 (excerpt La Litera información)
